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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the strategic behavior of hospitals in one of their primary output markets:
inpatient surgical procedures. High levels of learning-by-doing in surgical fields may act as a barrier
to entry. I investigate whether incumbent hospitals facing prospective entry in a procedure market
manipulate their procedure volumes to produce such a barrier. I derive straightforward empirical
tests from a model of patient demand, procedure quality, and differentiated product competition.
Using hospital data on electrophysiological studies, an invasive cardiac procedure, I find evidence
of entry-deterring investment in procedure volume. These findings suggest that competitive
motivations may play a role in treatment decisions.
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The hospital industry that has emerged after nearly two decades of cost-containment is both
more eﬃcient and more competitive. The survivors of the industry shakedown have adopted
many traditional business practices, ranging from strict budgeting and heavy marketing to
explicit collusion through aﬃliations with competitors. Whether hospitals engage in more
sophisticated strategic decisionmaking, as well as the implications of such behavior, remain
open questions. This paper investigates the use of one such practice: strategic investment
for the purpose of entry deterrence.
The setting for this analysis is an inpatient surgical procedure market, such as the market
for open heart surgery. Research has shown that providers with more experience produce
better outcomes, and as this research has disseminated, information about physician and
hospital experience levels has become more access i b l e .T h eh i g hd e g r e eo fl e a r n i n g - b y - d o i n g
in many of these markets raises the possibility that learning-by-doing may act as a barrier
to entry, as noted by Ho (2002) in a recent study of the diﬀusion of coronary angioplasty.
I investigate whether incumbent hospitals facing prospective entry in a procedure market
increase their procedure volume to produce such a barrier. Perhaps by creating a “center
of excellence” in a given procedure market, hospitals can forestall new entrants, whose
comparative lack of experience is unattractive to patients, physicians, and insurers alike.
The theory of strategic investment, in which an incumbent ﬁrm (the “ﬁrst mover”)
adjusts its investment in period 1 because its choice aﬀects play in period 2, originates in
Stackelberg (1934) and is extended by Spence (1977, 1979), Dixit (1979, 1980), and others.
Several of these authors, notably Spence (1984) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983, 1986),
1note the possibility of using experience for strategic eﬀect. The opportunity to squeeze or
even eliminate competitors by moving quickly along a ﬁrm-speciﬁc learning curve has not
eluded businesses in several key industries; for example, it is widely reported that airplane
manufacturers price below cost for the ﬁrst several hundred units of a new design, a strategy
that often succeeds in deterring or severely handicapping the entry of competing aircraft
(Newhouse 1982).
Although inpatient surgical procedures are a primary output of the hospital industry,
research on competition within surgical procedure markets — or even the concept of a surgical
procedure market - is not well-developed. Several papers have explored the relationship
between a hospital’s decision to oﬀer a particular service or surgery and the competitive
environment in which it operates, but few have oﬀered a structural interpretation of this
relationship or provided a model of competitive play.1 In addition, the role of learning-
by-doing in surgery, though well-documented, has only been linked anecdotally to market
structure. This paper formalizes these relationships by explicitly modeling the demand
and supply for surgical procedures, incorporating the role of learning-by-doing into the
production function, and positing a diﬀerentiated-products game that governs play among
market participants. I use this model to illustrate the incentives for strategic investment
in learning-by-doing, focusing on incumbents’ ability to deter entry through this channel.
To develop testable predictions, I use an approach presented in Ellison and Ellison (2000).
Ellison and Ellison demonstrate that investment by incumbents facing entry should increase
monotonically with market potential unless entry deterrence incentives are present. These
1Exceptions include Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Fendrick (2002), who model entry into bypass surgery
as a function of expected patient ﬂows, and Vogt (1999), who considers preemption motives for acquisition of
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines in duopoly hospital markets.
2incentives are strongest in markets of intermediate attractiveness, where potential entrants
are “on the fence” and are likeliest to be swayed by incumbents’ actions. In the context
of surgical procedure markets, where the investment is volume, the testable implication is
that procedure growth should be strongest in markets of intermediate potential if hospitals
attempt to deter entry.
Using nationwide data from MedPAR, the Medicare claims database, I investigate the
relationship between the probability of entry and volume growth in local markets for electro-
physiological studies (EP). I focus on incumbents’ growth following the announcement of
a reimbursement increase for EP in 1989. I ﬁnd the strongest volume response among
incumbent providers in markets facing intermediate ex-ante threats of entry. This cross-
sectional ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in a panel analysis using data from 1985-1989. Controlling for
incumbent ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects, and time trends that vary by the probability of
entry, I ﬁnd that volume growth between 1988 and 1989 is statistically larger for incumbents
in intermediate markets than for incumbents in markets with low or high ex-ante entry
probabilities (48 and 44 percentage points larger, respectively). These point estimates
imply a substantial impact of entry deterrence motives on hospital volumes for procedures
characterized by a high degree of learning-by-doing.
The following section describes prior research on learning-by-doing in surgical procedures
and strategic entry deterrence. In section 3, I draw on these literatures to develop a dynamic
model of competition, and to derive empirically testable predictions that discern between
strategic and non-strategic investment patterns. In Section 4, I test these predictions using
hospital-level data on electrophysiological studies from 1985-1989. Section 5 concludes.
32B a c k g r o u n d
The model presented in Section 3 is based on two distinct literatures: medical research
on learning-by-doing in surgery, and theoretical and empirical economic research on entry
deterrence. I combine the results from these literatures, together with observations on
hospital markets, to build a model of entry deterrence through learning-by-doing in surgical
procedure markets.
2.1 Learning-by-Doing in Surgery
Since the late 1970s, medical researchers have published hundreds of articles investigating
the relationship between surgical volume and patient outcomes. Although the strength of
this relationship diﬀers across studies, procedures, and outcome measures, the resounding
conclusion from this research is that, for many procedures, there is a strong, positive correlation
between procedure-speciﬁc hospital volume and outcomes, and this correlation is robust to
detailed controls for patient risk factors, hospital characteristics, surgeon volume, and local
sociodemographics.
Procedures with strong hospital volume/outcome relationships include coronary artery
bypass surgery (CABG), cardiac catheterization, prostatectomy, total hip replacement, and
resectioning of abdominal aortic aneurysms, to list only a few. Examples of procedures with
weak or insigniﬁcant associations include cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal), inguinal
hernia repair, and femur fraction reduction; these are all procedures that require less technical
expertise to obtain successful outcomes.2 Although this evidence is suggestive of learning-
2The evidence on the relationship between surgeon volumes and outcomes is less conclusive, although there
is consensus that a positive correlation is present for select procedures (e.g. carotid endarterectomy), and
4by-doing in surgery, there are a number of limitations of the medical literature that render
such a conclusion premature. First, the outcome measures used in most studies − inpatient
mortality, length of stay, and post-surgery complications − are extremely limited. Hospitals
with low volumes are at greater risk for extremely high levels of these variables simply
because of statistical chance. Second, although the studies attempt to control for patient
risk factors, the potential for omitted variables is clearly problematic. Third, these studies
cannot distinguish between two alternate hypotheses for the volume/outcome phenomenon:
the “practice makes perfect” or learning-by-doing hypothesis, and the “selective referral”
hypothesis, which maintains that hospitals with good outcomes generate high volumes, rather
than vice-versa.
The few studies that have attempted to separate these eﬀects have found support for
both. Simultaneous-equation estimates of the outcome-volume relation and the volume-
outcome relation by Luft, Hunt, and Maerski (1987) reveal a signiﬁcant, positive bilateral
relationship for total hip replacement and hysterectomy. The “practice makes perfect”
eﬀect dominates for some acute conditions such as heart attack, where referral is less likely
due to the emergency nature of the incident, as well as other conditions such as stomach
and intestinal operations, which are usually managed by family physicians who may be
insuﬃciently informed to guide patients to the best facilities.3 The “selective referral”
eﬀect dominates for aneurysms, prostatectomy, and CABG, procedures which are likely to be
preceded by specialty consultations. Mukamel and Mushlin (1998) ﬁnd that facilities with
there is substantial evidence that very low-volume operators obtain extremely poor results across a range of
surgical procedures (e.g. Hughes, Hunt and Luft 1987, Cebul et al. 1998).
3Note that Hunt, Luft, and Maerski (1987) use data gathered in 1972 for the Professional Activities Study
by the Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities (CPHA), as do many of the studies described in
this section. Thus, hospital choice was far less restricted during the period explored in this body of literature
than is the case today.
5superior CABG outcomes increased their market share relative to other facilities following
the release of outcome data by the New York State Department of Health beginning in 1990.
Finally, recent work by Ho (2002) extends the instrumental variables approach to hospital
costs as well as industry learning-by-doing eﬀects. Using data on angioplasties performed in
California between 1984 and 1996, Ho ﬁnds evidence of hospital-speciﬁc as well as industry-
wide learning-by-doing, both for outcomes and for costs.
This paper does not attempt to enter the debate described above; however, the model
outlined in section 3 borrows heavily from this literature. First, I use volume as an indicator of
hospital quality, an assumption that reﬂects the “practice makes perfect” hypothesis. Second,
I assume that patient demand responds to quality, the “selective referral” hypothesis. Finally,
I require that hospitals are aware that volume begets volume, so they may consider strategies
to increase their volume for competitive eﬀect.
The prominence of procedure volume data in hospital marketing communications suggests
that hospitals are indeed cognizant of this link. For example, the Cleveland Clinic website
boasts, “ [The] Cerebrovascular Center has one of the highest stroke-related patient volumes in
North America. The Center treats over 2,000 cerebrovascular patients annually. High patient
volumes provide our specialists with extensive experience, resulting in a team that routinely
treats common problems and manages rare disorders much more frequently than smaller
centers.” A 2002 ad for Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in The New York Times
implores patients to “consider how much experience the hospital staﬀ has in performing the
speciﬁc procedures you need. Studies have demonstrated that, for many cancers, hospitals
with a high volume of surgical cases had lower patient mortality and more positive patient
outcomes than hospitals with lower volume.” Organ transplant programs, cardiac surgery
6centers, and joint replacement services, among others, also emphasize procedure volumes in
communications materials. In addition, medical associations, surgical accreditation boards,
and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) provide procedure-speciﬁc volume guidelines
for surgeons and/or hospitals. For example, Medicare will only cover liver transplants in
centers that have performed 12 or more procedures per year for 3 consecutive years.4 The
American College of Surgeons recommends at least 200 open-heart surgeries per hospital in
order to “function eﬃciently” and attain quality goals. Finally, the growing body of volume-
outcome research and the resulting interest in regionalizing specialized procedures suggest
that hospitals are likely to be aware of the volume-outcome-volume link.
2.2 Strategic Entry Deterrence
The theoretical literature on entry deterrence is well-developed (see Wilson (1992) in The
Handbook of Game Theory for a good review). Within this literature, works on strategic
preemption, characterized by incumbents’ eﬀorts to retain market dominance through irrever-
sible investments, are most pertinent to the topic at hand.5 The critical insight from these
models is that a sunk investment, be it in cost-cutting, capacity, advertising, or experience,
credibly commits the incumbent to a particular course of action and therefore gives it an
edge in strategic play. For example, an existing auto-assembly ﬁrm that builds a large new
plant credibly commits to producing more vehicles in the event of entry (and perhaps in
the absence of entry as well), thereby reducing the potential proﬁts of an entrant and the
4Approval is site-speciﬁc, so a hospital cannot gain immediate approval by hiring a team of experienced
surgeons.
5Wilson describes two additional broad categories of entry-deterrence models: signaling (or signal-jamming)
models, in which incumbents convey (or block) information about their markets with the purpose of
discouraging entry or promoting exit, and predation models, in which incumbents price aggressively to destroy
the viability of an entrant.
7likelihood of entry.
Spence (1984) demonstrates the role of the learning curve, or accumulated experience,
in erecting barriers to entry. Specifying a unit cost function that decreases in accumulated
experience, Spence illustrates the cost advantage that accrues to early entrants. Spence and
subsequent authors (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole 1986) emphasize the diﬀerence between simple
precommitment (“open loop”) equilibria, in which the ﬁrst mover recognizes the future cost
savings associated with increased output in the current period, and perfect (“closed loop”)
equilibria, in which the ﬁrst mover also considers the eﬀect of current output on competitors’
actions. In any given period, strategic considerations may lead ﬁr m st op r o d u c em o r eo r
less than the open-loop optimum, depending on the exact nature of competition. In section
3, I present a simple model of quality competition among hospitals in which the closed-loop
optimum implies overinvestment in production relative to the open-loop optimum.
The empirical literature on entry deterrence is rather sparse, with most studies documenting
competitive responses to investment decisions rather than identifying strategic motives for the
investments. Examples of such papers include Lieberman (1987), who ﬁnds that incumbents
in concentrated chemical processing industries reduce investment in response to expansions
by rivals, and Chevalier (1995), who ﬁnds that leveraged buyouts of supermarket chains
are followed by softer product-market competition. Such studies suggest that capacity and
capital structure are eﬀective vehicles for strategic investment, but do not constitute prima
facie evidence that such investment is taking place.
Two recent papers, Vogt (1999) and Ellison and Ellison (2000), construct speciﬁc tests for
strategic preemption. Using data on adoption dates of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
technology in 31 duopoly hospital markets, Vogt ﬁnds evidence of preemption through early
8adoption by a rival. Ellison and Ellison study the advertising, product presentation, and
pricing behavior of pharmaceutical ﬁrms facing an immediate threat of generic entry due to
patent expiration. Because the strategic incentive to deter entry is greatest in markets where
entry is probable, as compared to markets where it is eﬀectively blockaded (i.e. the drug has
extremely small revenues) or extremely likely (e.g. Prozac), the authors look for investment
behavior that is nonmonotonic in entry probability. They ﬁnd evidence supportive of entry
deterrence: incumbents in medium-sized markets are more likely than incumbents in small
or large markets to decrease advertising and increase the variety of product presentations
immediately prior to patent expiration. Both behaviors reduce the expected proﬁts of an
entrant, and should increase monotonically with market potential if entry deterrence motives
are absent. This reasoning underlies the empirical tests I conduct in Section 4.
To summarize, the theoretical concepts tested in this paper are well-founded in the
industrial organization literature. My contribution is to reformulate the models to reﬂect
the unique features of the hospital industry, and in so doing to uncover a critical relationship
between investment and volume that enables an empirical test of entry deterrence without
data on the investments themselves. This paper also contributes to the ﬂedgling empirical
literature on strategic entry deterrence, applying a recently-developed identiﬁcation strategy
to a vital industry.
93 A Model of Entry Deterrence Through Learning-by-Doing
3.1 Assumptions
In standard learning-by-doing models, ﬁrms that produce beyond the single-period optimum
a c q u i r em o r ee x p e r i e n c ea tt h ee x p e n s eo fc u r r e n tp r o ﬁts, since the increased production
drives market price down. In hospital markets, however, supply and demand do not
equilibrate contemporaneously via a price mechanism. The nation’s largest insurer, Medicare,
dictates a ﬁxed price for each of roughly 500 Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), and private
insurers negotiate reimbursement amounts with individual hospitals. Moreover, insured
patients do not typically bear the marginal costs of treatment, as hospital stays generally
exhaust deductibles and co-payment caps. A hospital seeking to expand current production
in one of its product lines (say, cardiac surgery) must attract patients through other means:
advertising, referral networks, amenities, and quality of care. Thus, price P is not considered
a choice variable for hospitals in this model; hospitals may, however, adjust any of the other
variables.6
A hospital can manipulate the other factors mentioned above, however, and I will aggregate
these choices into a variable called quality, denoted by L. Quantity demanded for a given
procedure in hospital i at time t, denoted Qi
t, is assumed to be an increasing function of













6Note that the model is tested on Medicare data, and since Medicare beneﬁciaries face the same out-of-
pocket price at all hospitals, a hospital cannot increase volume by lowering price.
10Although I have omitted procedure subscripts, all variables are at the procedure level, so
that L and Q refer to quality and quantity for a particular procedure, respectively.
Learning-by-doing is incorporated in the production function for quality by including a
term for accumulated experience. The other inputs into quality are jointly measured by the
variable K, which can be loosely interpreted as current expenditure (on equipment, extra
nurses, advertising, etc.). For simplicity, K is not durable and expires at the end of each



















The second argument in l captures the “practice makes perfect” eﬀect discussed in section
2, as procedure quality is assumed to increase in a hospital’s experience with the procedure.
The “selective referral eﬀect” is reﬂected in the function for quantity demanded, in that a
hospital acquires more patients if it oﬀers a higher quality level. Thus, volume begets more
volume. The role of K should not be understated, however, as it is the means by which a
hospital produces quality upon entry, and also the only factor a hospital can adjust to rapidly




(∂Li)2 < 0 to ensure a unique equilibrium.
For simplicity, the cost per procedure is ﬁxed at c and the cost per unit of K is ﬁxed at
r. Finally, I assume the entrant incurs a cost E upon entry, where E is stochastic and its
cumulative distribution function F(E) is known to all parties.7
7Were E not stochastic, the model would be deterministic: the K
M
1 needed to deter entry would be known,
and entry-deterring investment would either be successful or would not be undertaken at all.
113.2 Model
I begin with a standard 3-period strategic investment model, summarized in the following
diagram:
t =1 t =2 t =3









































where the superscript M refers to the monopolist when she is the sole supplier, and DM
and DE to the former monopolist and the entrant, respectively, if entry occurs. The proﬁt
functions are assumed to be concave in K,a n dt h ep a y o ﬀs in the event of entry result from
a unique Nash equilibrium in the second-period game.






































The solution for K2 is straightforward: the incumbent simply picks the optimal amount given
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The term on the left-hand-side measures the cost associated with investment beyond the
single-period optimum; because this investment pays oﬀ in future periods as well as in the
current period, this term should be positive. The ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand-side
constitute the “open loop” or non-strategic ﬁrst-order condition, in which the incumbent
takes the entrant’s behavior, including the probability of entry, as given. The third term is
the “strategic entry accommodation” term, which incorporates the eﬀect of the incumbent’s
investment decision in the ﬁrst period on the entrant’s choice of K
DE
2 . If it is greater
(less) than zero, an incumbent that is accommodating entry in its market will overinvest
(underinvest) in KM
1 relative to the open-loop optimum. My focus is on the fourth term,
the “strategic entry deterrence” eﬀect.
The magnitude of the entry deterrence eﬀect increases in the diﬀerence between monopoly
and duopoly proﬁts in the second period, as well as in the probability mass of E at π
DE
2 .
Intuitively, this means that the incentive to deter entry is greatest when substantial proﬁts
are at stake, and when the entrant is likely to be “on the fence” in terms of its entry decision.
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determines whether the incumbent will overinvest or underinvest in order to deter entry.
Under a broad set of conditions derived in Appendix A, this term is unambiguously negative,
implying that the entry deterrence eﬀect increases investment.
133.3 Generating Testable Predictions
Using ﬁrst-order conditions to discern the eﬀect of entry deterrence motives on hospital
investment decisions would be prohibitively diﬃcult; not only would the researcher need
exact proﬁt, demand, and quality functions, she would also require hospital investment data
at the procedure level. This section describes the two elements needed to transform the
ﬁrst-order condition into an empirically testable relationship.
First, I use a result derived in Ellison and Ellison (2000). The authors introduce a
variable z into the proﬁt and cost functions for the incumbent and the potential entrant,








2 ,z) > 0. They illustrate that, under certain conditions, the
incumbent’s investment is monotone increasing in z in the absence of the entry-deterrence
eﬀect. (This situation would prevail, for example, if the incumbent’s investment were
not revealed to the entrant prior to the entry decision.)8 The conditions under which
this proposition holds are not demanding, and a more thorough discussion is presented in
Appendix B. Intuitively, this result simply means that in the absence of entry-deterrence
motives, incumbents’ investments will increase monotonically with market potential.
Having established monotonicity of investment in z when entry-deterrence objectives are
absent, the authors then illustrate nonmonotonicity when entry-deterrence objectives are
present. This follows intuitively from an examination of the entry-deterrence term, now
8The ﬁrst-order condition used to obtain K
M∗
1 in this case does incorporate the strategic entry



















































2 ), the probability density of entrants who are indiﬀerent between entering and not
entering the market, does not increase monotonically in market attractiveness. When the
market is extremely attractive or unattractive, few entrants will be indiﬀerent; f(π
DE
2 ) will
be largest when z has an intermediate value. Because f(π
DE
2 ) is multiplied by the diﬀerence
between duopoly and monopoly proﬁts, the strategic entry deterrence eﬀect can be rather
large, generating an investment curve that is nonmonotonic in z. In the surgical procedure
setting, the prediction is that investment in KM
1 will be greatest in markets where incumbents
perceive entry to be possible, as compared to markets where entry is unlikely or likely. Figure
1 provides an illustration of such a pattern.
The second component needed to transform the incumbent’s ﬁrst-order condition into
a testable relationship concerns KM
1 . Although KM
1 is unobservable, the end product of
the investment, ﬁrst-period procedure volume (QM
1 ), can be measured. Thus, changes in
procedure volume, after controlling for covariates, can proxy for investment in quality. This
result is a feature of the model sketched above; a proﬁt-maximizing hospital would only spend
money to boost quality if the quality improvement generated more business at the ﬁxed price
P.9 It is important to recognize, however, that learning-by-doing is the strategic investment
vehicle in this model. An incumbent seeking to deter entry invests in quality in the ﬁrst
9The result would be unaﬀected if quality itself had a positive weight in the hospital’s objective function.
15period because the resulting increase in ﬁrst-period volume increases quality in the second
period.
To summarize, the prediction of interest is that incumbents with strong motives to
deter entry will spend money to boost their quality in period 1. This will increase the
number of procedures they perform in period 1, raising their cumulative procedure volume
and depressing the proﬁts of a potential entrant in all subsequent periods. Because an
increase in expenditure in period 1 translates directly into an increase in volume, I will use
volume increases to study incumbents’ investment behavior; I need not observe quality or
expenditures. I will investigate whether incumbents in markets of intermediate attractiveness,
where entry-deterring investment can have the greatest impact on the entry decision, exhibit
the strongest volume growth in the face of shocks that increase industry proﬁts.
4 Testing the Model: The Market for Electrophysiological
Studies
4.1 Market Selection
To test these predictions empirically, I sought a surgical procedure that satisﬁed the key
conditions dictated by the model: (1) a high degree of learning-by-doing; (2) a large ﬁxed
investment upon entry; (3) demand that is increasing in the quality of the procedure. In order
to conduct a more rigorous test of the model, I further restricted my search to procedures
that experienced positive proﬁtability shocks. This setting enables me to explore both the
cross-sectional prediction that markets with intermediate entry probabilities will demonstrate
stronger volume growth than markets with low or high entry probabilities, and the time-
16series prediction that such markets will exhibit the most aggressive responses to a shock that
heightens the threat of entry. Lastly, the procedure had to be well-represented among the
elderly, as Medicare’s inpatient database (MedPAR) is the only source of national longitudinal
data with a suﬃciently large sample size for my purposes. The procedure that best fulﬁlls
these criteria is electrophysiological study, or EP.10
Introduced in the early 1980s, EP is a highly-specialized invasive procedure to identify and
possibly treat cardiac arrhythmias. The heart is stimulated at various rates and cadences,
and electrode catheters placed within veins or arteries record the responses. Therapeutic
ablation, in which tissue is destroyed using high-frequency currents, may also be performed.11
The Manual of Cardiovascular Medicine stresses the importance of a highly experienced
operator in obtaining a successful outcome (criterion 1). Residents must complete 8 years
of training before being permitted to assist in an EP. EP is performed in a specially-
equipped cardiac catheterization lab, which entails a large ﬁxed entry cost (criterion 2).
Patients are referred to EP by cardiologists, who should be aware of quality diﬀerentials
among area hospitals (criterion 3). In addition, the procedure is well-represented in the
Medicare population. Tabulations using California’s census of hospital discharges (OSHPD)
indicate that roughly half of EP procedures are performed on Medicare beneﬁciaries.
Although EP is extremely costly (hospitals reported expenses of $5,000 to $21,000 in 1988
10After identifying a comprehensive list of surgical procedures that experienced a sudden technological
change or a large increase in Medicare reimbursement between 1984 and 1996, the period for which I
have the MedPAR data, I reviewed medical literature and interviewed physicians to establish how well
each procedure satisﬁes the technical criteria listed above. As a ﬁnal screen, I used MedPAR data and
data from California’s state inpatient database to identify providers for each candidate procedure, rejecting
those procedures that were performed in only a small number of markets during the pre-shock period (e.g.
extracorporeal photopheresis, a cancer treatment in which a patient’s blood is passed through an external
device and exposed to ultraviolet light) or on a small number of Medicare patients (e.g. bone marrow
transplants).
11The Miller-Keane Medical Dictionary; Manual of Cardiovascular Medicine (2000).
17dollars), it did not aﬀect DRG assignment for several years. Patients undergoing EP were
typically placed in DRGs 138 and 139 for cardiac arrhythmias, with 1988 reimbursements of
roughly $1800 and $2700, respectively. At the beginning of 1989, HCFA announced it was
considering a reimbursement increase and established a new procedure code to determine
the correct amount. Beginning in 1990, EP was designated a “non-OR procedure,” placing
recipients in higher-paying surgical DRGs. Reimbursements for these DRGs (104, 106, 108,
and 112) ranged from $6,500 to $26,700.12 Thus, the attractiveness of entry increased
dramatically in 1990. In the context of the 3-period model, 1988 represents t=1, 1989 is
t=2, and 1990 is t=3. An incumbent’s EP volume growth between 1988 and 1989 serves as
ap r o x yf o rKM
1 .
Hospitals entering in 1990 (t=3) observe KM
1 prior to making their entry decisions.
Unfortunately, the real world operates in continuous time, so entry can and does occur in
t=2; this is a problem I address in the empirical analysis below.
4.2 Data
I obtain estimates of annual hospital EP volumes using a 20% sample of the 1985-1989
Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MedPAR) ﬁles. This comprehensive data source
contains information on all hospitalizations of Medicare enrollees, including surgical procedure
codes and hospital identiﬁcation numbers.13 The 20% sample comprises 2.1 to 2.8 million
individual records per year. After aggregating the procedure data to the hospital level, each
hospital is matched to a record from the 1988 Annual Survey of Hospitals by the American
12Estimates calculated by multiplying DRG weights by the standard hospital amount for large urban
hospitals (Sources: 53 FR 38476, 54 FR 19636, 54 FR 36452). All years refer to HCFA’s ﬁscal years,
which begin in October of the preceding calendar year.
13Inpatient stays by HMO enrollees, who accounted for 5.2 percent of Medicare beneﬁciaries in 1990, are
not included in the data.
18Hospital Association (AHA). This survey provides detailed information on virtually all US
hospitals, including service oﬀerings and utilization statistics.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for incumbent providers, deﬁned as hospitals perform-
ing EP in 1988 and 1989.14 Between 1985 and 1989, the average incumbent’s volume
increased four-fold, reaching 35 procedures per year (recall that the data in Table 1 is a 20%
sample). The mean value for the dependent variable, ln(1989 volume) - ln(1988 volume),
is .27, with substantial variation around this mean. Compared to the average US hospital,
incumbent EP providers are more than twice as large and six times more likely to oﬀer cardiac
catheterization and open heart surgery.
Table 1 also reports market characteristics for the Hospital Service Areas in which incum-
bents are located, as deﬁned by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care (1996). These HSAs
were constructed by assigning each zip code to the HSA where the greatest proportion
of its Medicare residents was hospitalized in 1992 and 1993. There are 3,436 HSAs in
the United States, with population ranging between 866 (Hoven, South Dakota) and 2.7
million (Chicago); of these, 149 had EP incumbents in 1988. On average, incumbents
faced 1.5 competitors in 1988. There were 96 HSAs with monopolist incumbents (therefore
contributing 96 hospital-level observations), 28 with two incumbents (56 hospital-level obser-
vations), and 25 with three or more incumbents (95 hospital-level observations).
14Of the 252 incumbent providers, I exclude four that stopped performing EP in 1989, and one that could
not be matched to a Hospital Service Area.
194.3 Empirical Analysis
4.3.1 Cross-sectional analysis
To investigate whether volume growth is nonmonotonic in entry probability, I begin with
a cross-sectional analysis, in which I regress ln(1989 volume) - ln(1988 volume) for every
incumbent on a measure of the ex ante entry probability in that incumbent’s HSA. While
the ex post entry probability for HSAs with similar characteristics can be calculated from the
data, it is endogenous to incumbents’ investment decisions. For example, if hospitals facing
an intermediate ex ante threat of entry succeed in increasing volume and deterring entrants,
the ex post entry probability for such hospitals would be lower than the actual ex ante threat.
As a result, I estimate ex ante entry probability as the number of potential entrants in the
incumbent’s HSA, rather than using actual entry data to predict these probabilities, as is
done in Ellison and Ellison (2000). I deﬁne a potential entrant as a non-incumbent hospital
with cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery facilities.15 A catheterization lab is a
prerequisite to establishing an EP service, while open heart surgery is a complement and
safety backup for EP.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the number of potential and actual entrants.16
103 out of 247 incumbent providers are located in HSAs without any potential entrants
(as deﬁned above), and the ex-post probability of entry for hospitals in these markets is
correspondingly low (9 percent). The ex-post probability of entry reaches nearly one-half for
15Children’s hospitals and federal government hospitals are not counted as potential entrants; none of the
incumbents falls into these categories.
16Of the 423 providers that performed EP for the ﬁrst time in 1989 or 1990, I exclude 5 due to missing data
and 11 that exited in 1989. I also drop 91 providers that performed fewer than 3 procedures during the entire
period for which I have the data, 1985-1996. This restriction minimizes the number of hospitals labeled as
entrants solely due to coding errors.
20hospitals facing one potential entrant, jumps to 85 percent for hospitals with two potential
entrants, and declines slightly for hospitals in markets with three or more potential entrants.
Thus, the ex-ante measure of entry probability accords well with the ex-post realization, and
if hospitals are behaving strategically, investment should peak in markets with one potential
entrant. Indeed, Figure 2, which graphs unadjusted incumbent growth rates against the
number of potential entrants, mirrors the theoretical pattern in Figure 1.
To control for other factors that may be contributing to this pattern, I estimate speciﬁcations
of the following form:




The dependent variable is the continuous growth rate for hospital h in market m.U s i n g
the growth rate rather than the absolute change in volume accounts for diﬀerences in the size
of individual hospitals’ programs; an increase of 5 procedures represents a larger investment
for a program initially performing 10 procedures per year than for a program performing 50.
The independent variables of interest are the indicator variables for the number of potential
entrants, with zero as the omitted category. Because these variables vary at the HSA level,
all standard errors are corrected for correlation within HSAs. A ﬁnding of b β1 > b β4+
constitutes conclusive evidence of entry deterrence; as Figure 1 illustrates, such a result
requires an extremely strong entry deterrence eﬀect. If the underlying monotonic relationship
between volume growth and entry probability is steep or convex, hospitals facing intermediate
21entry probabilities will not exhibit signiﬁcantly higher growth than hospitals subject to high
entry probabilities, even in the presence of entry-deterring investment. Because the omitted
category represents a low entry probability, absent any controls all of the coeﬃcients in b β
should be greater than zero.
Caution must be exercised when including additional controls, as these controls may be
collinear with market attractiveness, precisely the factor the potential entrant indicators are
meant to capture. Xh is a vector of hospital-level controls, consisting of all of the variables
reported in Table 1: years of EP experience, ownership status, teaching status, indicator for
catheterization lab and open heart surgery facilities, annual number of surgical operations,
and number of beds. Zh is a vector of market-level controls, including population and its
square, the EP penetration rate (=number of EP procedures/population), the EP “access
rate” (=number of incumbents/population), and an indicator for entry in 1989 (t=2). If
a market experiences entry in 1989, incumbents did not have a full year to expand their
programs prior to the entry decision, so their investment levels may be depressed relative to
those of hospitals in markets that did not experience such entry. Because entry at any time
is likeliest in markets with multiple potential entrants, the results may be biased in favor of
nonmonotonicity in the absence of a control for such entry. All other control variables are
measured as of 1988, with the exception of population, which is only available for 1990.
Column 1 of Table 3 presents estimates of β from the most parsimonious speciﬁcation,
which excludes all control variables. Column 2 adds hospital controls, column 3 adds the
indicator for entry in 1989, and column 4 adds all the remaining market control variables.
In all four speciﬁcations, a nonmonotonic investment pattern is evident, with the largest
coeﬃcient on I(potential entrants=1). Incumbents in these markets increased their procedure
22volumes approximately 30 percentage points more than did incumbents in markets with no
potential entrants, and 21 to 45 percentage points more than incumbents in markets with 4
or more potential entrants. As predicted, all coeﬃcients are positive in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation.
b β1 is statistically signiﬁcant at p<.05 in columns 1 and 2, and p<.10 in column 3. The
coeﬃcient on entry in 1989 is positive rather than negative, implying that early entry does
not bias the results in favor of nonmonotonicity. While the hospital control variables have
little impact on b β, the full set of HSA controls reduces the magnitude of these estimates, and
in particular the magnitude of b β1−b β4+. Because the potential entrant indicators vary at the
HSA level, the HSA controls are likely collinear with these regressors. Regardless, the general
nonmonotonic pattern of the point estimates is robust to this full set of controls. Overall,
the results in Table 3 are suggestive of entry deterrence, with b β1 > b β4 in all speciﬁcations.
However, the coeﬃcient estimates are too imprecise to reject b β1 = b β4+ at conventional levels
of signiﬁcance for 2 of the 4 speciﬁcations.
As with all cross-sectional analyses, a primary concern is the possibility that omitted
factors are driving the results. These concerns are mitigated in this setting because the
omitted factors would have to vary nonmonotonically with volume growth or market attractive-
ness in order to produce a bias. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that markets with
one potential entrant are fast-growing for reasons other than entry-deterring investment.
To address this possibility, I reformulate the regression speciﬁcation to control for diﬀerent
growth trends across market types (where “type” refers to the number of potential entrants)
prior to the proﬁtability shock in 1989.
234.3.2 Panel Analysis
To control for preexisting diﬀerences in growth rates across market types, I assemble a panel
dataset of EP volumes for each provider between 1985 and 1989, and estimate
ln(volume)mht = α +
P 4
i=1βiI(potential entrants=i)m + δt +
P 4
i=1µiI(potential entrants=i)m • yeart +
P 4
i=1γiI(potential entrants=i)m • I(1989)t +
ρI(entrant)mt + ϕZm + νXh + εmht,
where δt is a set of year dummies,
P 4
i=1µiI(potential entrants=i)m•yeart is a set of trends
for each market type, I(1989)t is an indicator variable for the “treatment” year, 1989, and
I(entrant)mt is an indicator variable for entry in an incumbent’s HSA in year t (with this
exception, all the variables in Xh and Zm are unchanged from the cross-sectional analysis).
γ captures the extra growth in 1989 by market type, controlling for trends by market type,
time-invariant diﬀerences associated with hospital and market characteristics (of which type
is one), and any shock associated with a new entrant. Column 1 of Table 4 presents the
estimates of γ from this speciﬁcation. The speciﬁcations in columns 2 and 3 are more
stringent, with market ﬁxed eﬀects in place of Zm in column 2 and hospital ﬁxed eﬀects in
place of Zm and Xh in column 3. (Hospital ﬁxed eﬀects obviate the need for market ﬁxed
eﬀects, as the latter consist of groups of the former.)
The coeﬃcient estimates in Table 4 reveal that incumbents in markets with a single
potential entrant increased their volume 46-48 percentage points more between 1988 and 1989
24than did incumbents in markets with no potential entrants, after controlling for diﬀerences
in growth trends across market types. This ﬁnding is robust to the inclusion of market or
hospital ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover, in the speciﬁcations with ﬁxed eﬀects, b β1 = b β4+ can now
be rejected in favor of b β1 > b β4+ at the α<.10 level.
Because the incentive to invest strategically existed in all years, these results constitute
strong evidence of entry deterrence: even controlling for pre-1989 diﬀerences in market growth
rates, hospitals in markets with intermediate entry probabilities boosted their procedure
volumes following the reimbursement announcement more than did hospitals of any other
market type.
4.3.3 Monopolist Incumbents
The analyses presented thus far include all incumbents, regardless of market structure.
Theoretically, the results should be stronger if the sample is restricted to monopolist incumbents.
First, monopolist incumbents do not have the incentive to free-ride oﬀ the entry-deterring
investments of rivals. Second, monopolists stand to lose more rents from private payers
if entry occurs than do incumbent duopolists or oligopolists (the eﬃciency eﬀect). Table
2 contains descriptive statistics on the number of potential and actual entrants in these
markets. Tables 5 and 6 present the cross-sectional and panel analyses, respectively, for the
96 monopolist incumbents.
The results are strongly consistent with a priori expectations. For each speciﬁcation,
b β1 is larger in this sample than in the sample of all incumbents. Due to the small sample
sizes and correspondingly large standard errors, however, the diﬀerences between the b β1 for
the two samples are not statistically signiﬁcant. Direct comparisons between estimates of
25β1 − β4+ cannot be made because the small number of monopolist markets with multiple
potential entrants necessitates a single category (2+), but b β1 − b β2+ is consistently large and
positive, and occasionally statistically signiﬁcant.
4.3.4 Did It Work?
Although the volume growth I document need not have succeeded in deterring entry in order
to have been ex ante optimal, evidence of this kind would vindicate the strategy. One naive
test for examining the eﬀectiveness of this strategy is to compare the actual entry incidence
experienced by hospitals with strong 1988-89 growth (i.e. those that attempted to deter
entry) with that by hospitals with weaker 1988-89 growth, focusing exclusively on markets
with one potential entrant. Unfortunately, the hospitals that made large investments during
this period are not randomly selected; it is likely that these are the most successful and
aggressive providers, and hence entry into their markets may be lower for this reason.
This bias notwithstanding, the data imply that strong growth is associated with a higher
probability of entry. Table 8 reports data on the 1989 residuals from the panel regression
with hospital ﬁxed eﬀects (Table 4, column 3). These residuals measure the extent to which
individual hospitals departed from the growth trends within their respective potential entrant
categories, controlling for year and hospital ﬁxed eﬀe c t sa sw e l la st h ee ﬀect of new entry
within the HSA. The data indicate that in markets with one potential entrant — where entry-
deterring investments appear to have been made — hospitals with unusually strong growth
experienced more entry than did hospitals with weaker growth. Thus, entrants appear to
have interpreted incumbents’ volume growth not as a barrier to entry but rather as a signal
of market potential.
26Although this naive test suggests entrants were undeterred by incumbents’ actions, such a
conclusion is premature. In addition to the binary entry decision, entrants’ choice of product
characteristics must be considered. To the extent that entrants diﬀerentiated themselves
from incumbents (i.e. by becoming low-quality, low-cost providers) as a result of incumbents’
investments, entry deterrence may have succeeded.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Hospital behavior is diﬃcult to study using traditional methods. The obfuscation of the
pricing mechanism and the diﬃculty in measuring quality necessitate a creative approach to
uncovering all actions, let alone strategic ones. Entry into new services is one of the few clear
indicators of hospital decisions, and has therefore attracted attention in the health economics
and industrial organization literatures. Although several researchers have investigated the
reduced-form relationship between Herﬁndahl-type measures of hospital competition and
service oﬀerings (e.g. the “medical arms race” literature), few have studied strategic interactions
among players in local hospital markets.
In this paper, I focus on one of the most important and accessible measures of quality
at the procedure level, hospital volume, and ask whether hospitals invest in volume for the
purpose of deterring entry. The recent proliferation of self-proclaimed “centers of excellence”
may be a formalization of this strategy. By combining simple models of patient demand,
quality production, and diﬀerentiated product market competition, I am able to generate
clear theoretical predictions regarding entry deterrence through volume growth. The main
result is that procedure growth rates should increase monotonically in market attractiveness
27unless hospitals engage in entry-deterring investment. Such investment should be largest
where entry deterrence is likeliest to impact entry decisions: in markets of intermediate
attractiveness. When the entry deterrence incentive is suﬃciently strong, these markets will
grow at signiﬁcantly faster rates than markets with either low or high market potential,
simply because incumbents in these markets have a greater expected payoﬀ for investments
that are observed by potential entrants prior to making their entry decisions.
I test this model using hospital-level data on electrophysiological studies (EP), an invasive
cardiac procedure developed in the 1980s. I ﬁnd that hospitals facing an intermediate
probability of entry generated the strongest volume growth in the year following an announced
reimbursement increase for EP. This increase cannot be attributed to time-invariant omitted
variables, as it is present even after controlling for hospital ﬁxed eﬀects, nor to pre-existing
diﬀerences in growth trends, as it is robust to the inclusion of trends for each probability
group. In the most stringent speciﬁcations, the volume growth in intermediate markets is
statistically signiﬁcantly greater than that in low and high markets.
This research provides support for the hypothesis that hospitals manipulate surgical
volume for strategic eﬀect. In addition to revealing the sophistication of hospital decisionmaking,
this result contributes to the mounting evidence that the Hippocratic oath does not suﬃce
to protect patients from undergoing unnecessary but proﬁtable treatments. One mitigating
factor in this case is that entry deterrence through learning-by-doing will result in greater
specialization across hospitals and superior outcomes for patients, ceteris paribus. More
generally, stronger competition in quality will reduce the need for regulatory interventions
such as “certiﬁcates of need,” which are designed to constrain the number of providers of
a given service in order to improve quality and reduce duplicative costs. However, these
28beneﬁts must be weighed against the increased market power that remaining providers will
be able to exercise in the private market. A more thorough analysis of the welfare eﬀects of
entry deterrence in surgical procedure markets, while beyond the scope of this paper, is an
important next step for future research.
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31                               Figure 1.  Predicted Incumbent Investment Patterns
Incumbent Investment
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        Probability of Entry
           investment with entry deterrence motive
           investment without entry deterrence motive


















































1985 volume 1.56 (3.54)
1986 volume 2.01 (3.72)
1987 volume 2.91 (4.12)
1988 volume 5.11 (5.35)
1989 volume 6.99 (7.14)
ln(1989 volume) - ln(1988 volume) .27 (.87)




Teaching hospital .53 (.50)
Cath lab and open heart surgery .87 (.34)
Annual surgical operations 7852 (4458)
Beds 517 (250)
Market (HSA) Characteristics
Number of incumbents 2.47 (1.76)
Number of potential entrants 1.34 (1.70)
Entry in 1989 .22 (.42)
Entry in 1990 .28 (.45)
Entry in 1989 or 1990 .43 (.50)
Population 7.49 (6.24)
EP penetration rate 17.68 (23.07)
EP access rate .60 (.52)
(1)  Markets are Health Service Areas (HSAs) as defined in the Dartmouth Atlas (1996). 
(3)  Population isgiven for 1990 and measured in 100,000s.
(4)   EP penetration rate =(number of 1988 procedures in the HSA*5)/population.
(5)  EP access rate =number of incumbents in HSA/HSA population
Sources: 20% MedPAR sample 1985-1989, AHA 1988, Dartmouth Atlas (1996).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, EP Incumbents (N=247)
Notes:
Standard Deviation
(2)  Potential entrants are non-incumbent hospitals with catheterization labs and                       
open heart surgery facilities, located in the incumbent's HSA.  





  4+ 23 .78
All 247 .43
Notes:
(1)  The unit of observation is the hospital. 
Table 2.  Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Entry Measures, All Incumbents
(2)  Number of potential entrants is the number of non-incumbent hospitals with 
catheterization labs and open heart surgery facilities in the incumbent's HSA.
(3)  Ex-post entry probability is the mean value of an indicator for entry in the incumbent's 
HSA.
34Number of Potential Entrants
1 .330 ** .354 ** .299 * .170
(.150) (.149) (.157) (.157)
2 .218 .138 .038 -.082
(.163) (.178) (.191) (.224)
3 .173 .176 .062 -.018
(.219) (.230) (.236) (.249)
4+ .120 -.006 -.149 .012
(.221) (.208) (.196) (.237)
.19 .05 .02 .26
Control Variables
Hospital Controls                
[F-test]






HSA Controls                    
[F-test]
N N N  Y 
[.00]
Entry in 1989 .288 .152
(.168) (.159)
N 247 245 245 245
Notes
(3)  Robust standard errors corrected for correlation within HSAs are in parentheses.
(4)  * signifies p<.10, ** signifies p<.05, *** signifies p<.01
(2)  HSA controls include population, population squared, EP penetration rate, and EP access rate.
Table 3: Cross-Sectional Results, All Incumbents
Dependent Variable is ln(1989 volume)-ln(1988 volume) 
Test of H 0: coeff(pot. entrants=1) = coeff(pot. entrants=4+);  H 1:coeff(pot. entrants=1) > 
coeff(pot. entrants=4+).  P-values are reported.
(1)  Hospital controls include ownership type, teaching status, cath lab/open heart surgery dummy, number of beds, 
number of surgical operations, and years of EP experience (between 1985 and 1988).
35Number of Potential Entrants*I(1989)
1 .455 *** .459 ** .483 **
(.172) (.189) (.201)
2 .264 .189 .248
(.171) (.199) (.221)
3 .247 .220 .208
(.268) (.294) (.320)
4+ .110 .023 .047
(.294) (.315) (.323)
.13 .10 .10
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Number of Potential Entrants Fixed Effects Y N/A N/A
Number of Potential Entrants Trends Y Y Y












Entry dummy .034 -.026 .031
(.057) (.060) (.068)
HSA Fixed Effects N Y N/A
Hospital Fixed Effects N NY
N 849 849 856
Notes
(5)  * signifies p<.10, ** signifies p<.05, *** signifies p<.01
(4)  Robust standard errors corrected for correlation within HSAs are in parentheses.
(1)  Hospital controls include ownership type, teaching status, cath lab/open heart surgery dummy, number of 
beds, number of surgical operations, and years of EP experience (between 1985 and 1988).
Table 4. Panel Results, All Incumbents, 1985-89
Dependent Variable is ln(volume)
Test of H 0: coeff(pot. entrants=1)*I(1989) = coeff(pot. entrants=4+)*I(1989);  
H 1:coeff(pot. entrants=1)*I(1989) > coeff(pot. entrants=4+)*I(1989).  P-values are 
reported.
(3)  Entry dummy equals 1 in any year in which there is entry in the incumbent's HSA (except 
when the incumbent is the entrant)
(2)  HSA controls include population, population squared, EP penetration rate, and EP access rate.
36Number of Potential Entrants N Ex-post probability of entry
0 58 0.09
1 22 0.36
  2+ 16 0.94
All 96 .29
Notes:
(1)  The unit of observation is the hospital, which is the same as the HSA in this case.
Table 5.  Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Entry Measures, Monopolist Incumbents
(2)  Number of potential entrants is the number of non-incumbent hospitals with catheterization labs 
and open heart surgery facilities in the incumbent's HSA.
37Number of Potential Entrants
1 .421 * .542 ** .518 ** .210
(.237) (.256) (.258) (.287)
2+ .302 .350 .120 -.394
(.209) (.233) (.225) (.376)
.33 .24 .06 .01
Control Variables
Hospital Controls                
[F-test]






HSA Controls                         
[F-test]
N N N  Y 
[.00]
Entry in 1989 .531 ** .359
(.255) (.234)
N 96 95 95 95
Notes
(3)  Robust standard errors corrected for correlation within HSAs are in parentheses.
(4)  * signifies p<.10, ** signifies p<.05, *** signifies p<.01
(2)  HSA controls include population, population squared, EP penetration rate, and EP access rate.
Test of H 0: coeff(pot. entrants=1) = coeff(pot. entrants=2+);  H 1:coeff(pot. entrants=1) 
> coeff(pot. entrants=2+).  P-values are reported.
Dependent Variable is ln(1989 volume)-ln(1988 volume) 
Table 6: Cross-Sectional Results, Monopolist Incumbents
(1)  Hospital controls include ownership type, teaching status, cath lab/open heart surgery dummy, number of 
beds, number of surgical operations, and years of EP experience (between 1985 and 1988).
38Number of Potential Entrants*I(1989)





Year Fixed Effects Y Y
Number of Potential Entrants Fixed Effects Y N/A
Number of Potential Entrants Trends Y Y










Entry dummy .096 .080
(.143) (.151)
Hospital=HSA Fixed Effects N Y
N 326 331
Notes
(5)  * signifies p<.10, ** signifies p<.05, *** signifies p<.01
(4)  Robust standard errors corrected for correlation within HSAs are in parentheses.
Table 7. Panel Results, Monopolist Incumbents, 1985-89
(3)  Entry dummy equals 1 in any year in which there is entry in the incumbent's HSA (except 
when the incumbent is the entrant)
Dependent Variable is 
ln(volume)
Test of H 0: coeff(pot. entrants=1)*I(1989) = coeff(pot. 
entrants=2+)*I(1989);  H 1:coeff(pot. entrants=1)*I(1989) > coeff(pot. 
entrants=2+)*I(1989).  P-values are reported.
(1)  Hospital controls include ownership type, teaching status, cath lab/open heart surgery 
dummy, number of beds, number of surgical operations, and years of EP experience (between 
1985 and 1988).
(2)  HSA controls include population, population squared, EP penetration rate, and EP access 
39Quartile of  Investment 
Residual N
Range of Investment 
Residual Incidence of Entry
1 16 (-1.07, -.42) .25
2 15 (-.42, -.02) .47
3 15 (-.02,.39) .60
4 15 (.39, 1.22) .66
Note:
Table 8. Incidence of Entry In Markets With One Potential Entrant
Investment residuals are 1989 residuals for hospitals facing one potential entrant, calculated 
using the model reported in column 3, Table 4.
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2 ,w h e r e0 reﬂects the entrant’s cumulative experience upon entry and Q0 reﬂects














2 ,0) = r
[P−c], where q1 denotes the derivative
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(1) Inputs into quality are complementary (l12 > 0) and































> 0 is that the marginal product of K
DM
2 increases with ﬁrst-period
volume, which in turn is an increasing function of KM
1 .
Under the above conditions, the entry deterrence term is unambiguously negative, implying
that the monopolist will overinvest in KM
1 to deter entry.
Appendix B
This appendix summarizes the monotonicity result presented in Ellison and Ellison (2000),
as applied to the model outlined in section 3. A more precise exposition can be found in the
original source.































The strategic entry accommodation eﬀect is already incorporated in the choice of KM
1 (z)











































































































































































Due to the concavity assumptions for the proﬁt functions, the denominator of this expression





dz > 0, KM∗
1 (z) is monotone nondecreasing
(nonincreasing) in z if both bracketed terms in the numerator are nonnegative (nonpositive).
Ellison and Ellison label the ﬁrst term the “direct eﬀect” of z on KM∗
1 ; it is positive if
increasing z raises marginal proﬁts more than it raises marginal investment costs. The
second bracketed term is the “competition eﬀect,” which is nonnegative if the marginal
duopoly proﬁts associated with an additional unit of KM∗
1 exceed or equal the marginal
monopoly proﬁts. Note that if demand is separable in Li and L−i, the competition eﬀect
drops out.
43